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SUMMARY
This article critically reviews the main debates and literature produced by international relations and comparative 
politics scholars connecting religion to the eruption of violence. Centrally,  it argues that,  despite fierce fractionalization 
in other fields of study,  academic work on the religion-violence nexus seems to be reaching an emerging consensus 
between rationalist and constructivist approaches,  approximating what Katzenstein and Sil have recently dubbed 
“eclectic theorizing.” It also surveys the virtues and weaknesses of current work,  and suggests avenues for future 
research. 
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¿CUÁL ES EL VÍNCULO ENTRE RELIGIÓN Y VIOLENCIA? 
UNA EVALUACIÓN DE LA LITERATURA
RESUMEN
Este artículo discute los debates centrales de la literatura académica sobre religión y violencia producida por los 
estudiosos de las relaciones internacionales y la política comparada. El argumento central es que,  a pesar de que 
en otros campos de estudio las aproximaciones racionalistas y constructivistas se enfrentan como explicaciones 
alternativas,  en los estudios sobre religión y violencia parece estar surgiendo un consenso que las combina,  al 
estilo de lo que Katzenstein y Sil bautizaron recientemente “teorización ecléctica”. El artículo destaca las virtudes 
y deficiencias del trabajo existente,  y sugiere vías para investigaciones futuras.
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INTRODUCTION
As Daniel Philpott and Eva Bellin argue in separate, newly published review articles, the study 
of global and comparative politics appears to have “found” religion only recently and sparsely 
(Philpott, 2009; Bellin, 2008.) A number of factors seem to account for this “delayed response” by 
social scientists—the most commonly mentioned ones being, on the one hand, the Cold War, whose 
end allowed for a shift the lenses of security scholars and political scientists in general from the 
ideological superpower rivalry toward non-ideological and non-international variants of conflict, 
and on the other, the pervasiveness of the secularism in assumption and methods1. Infamously, 
within the academe, Samuel Huntington was one of the driving forces behind this move with 
his argument about an impending “clash of civilizations”, which predicted that future conflicts 
would be waged by religiously-inspired cultural entities2 . Huntington’s injunction, coupled with 
very visible events of religiously-inspired violence, notably the Al Qaeda attacks on the US on 
September 11, 2001, served to revive academic interest specifically on the link between religion 
and political violence (Huntington, 1997.) Now, almost twenty years after the controversial thèse 
civilisatrice was born, scholars from different disciplines, including a few political scientists, have 
produced important theoretical reflections and empirical findings in this subarea. 
This literature review will attempt to present and assess the scholarly work that connects religion 
to violent conflict, placing a stronger emphasis on the main arguments and recent developments 
within Political Science3. I will proceed in the following manner. First, to give the reader a sense 
of the dimension of the religion and conflict nexus in global politics, I concern myself with the few 
but important empirical studies that have tried to gauge the extent to which religion actually plays 
an increasing role in violent struggles around the world. Next, I turn the lenses toward the major 
theoretical arguments and approaches launched by scholars to understand this phenomenon. 
Though I aim to offer assessments and critiques throughout this essay, I will conclude with general 
remarks regarding the body of literature surveyed and with some ideas for future research. By 
the end I aim to have demonstrated that studies on the impact of religion on conflict represent 
a good example of what Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil (2008, 2010) recently dubbed “eclectic 
theorizing,” insofar as the most persuasive analytical frames --indeed, the current “conventional 
wisdom”-- is constituted by arguments that combine rationalist and constructivist elements.
I. Establishing Correlations: What is the Impact of Religion on Conflict?
Until recently, claims regarding the alleged rise of religiously-based conflict were largely based on 
a few illustrative examples or on scattered evidence.  Political scientists were often content to point 
to a few highly visible cases of religious groups engaged in violent conflict in places like Israel 
and Palestine, Lebanon, the Sudan or on US soil, but without substantive cross-case empirical 
assessments to sustain the generalizing tone of their arguments. Sociologists, for their part, 
were more systematic in building a body of comparative case studies to develop comprehensive 
frameworks for understanding fundamentalism (Appleby et al., 2004.) This important work 
notwithstanding, the actual dimension of the impact of religion on violent conflict, both domestic 
and international, remained unclear. 
1 Ashutosh Varshney documents a similar story for the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in comparative politics. See Varshney,  2007.
2 Although Huntington’s was perhaps the most mainstream and well-known –because of the controversy that ensued- academic work 
linking religion to conflict,  he was not the first scholar to raise the importance of or to explore that link. See also Juergensmeyer,  1993 
and Barber,  1995. 
3 For broader overviews regarding the study of religion and politics,  see the cite review pieces by Bellin,  2008 and Philpott,  2009.
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Recent work has begun to fill this gap. To begin with, in a series of quantitative studies, Jonathan 
Fox has devoted much effort to determine, among others, the extent to which religious conflict 
has actually increased since the 1950s in absolute as well as in relative numbers-- that is, vis-à-vis 
non-religious conflicts (Fox, 2004a, 2004b.) Based on data from the State Failure project4, which 
codes revolutionary, ethnic and genocidal wars from 1950 onward, Fox establishes that, contra 
Huntington, though religious conflicts have increased since the 1950, so have non-religious ones, 
dispelling the idea that the relative proportion of “wars over the divine” would outnumber civil 
conflicts. Furthermore, Fox’s data suggests that both religious and non-religious conflicts have 
sharply decreased after the Cold War (at least until 1996, his cutoff point,) refuting Huntington’s 
predictions. 
Fox’s findings also contradict arguments based on secularization theory, which predicted the 
general decline of religion’s influence in the world: Though according to Fox’s analysis religious 
conflict has started to drop in the early 1990s, the same trend is also seen in broader conflict 
trends. As a result, the decline in conflict around the world cannot be readily attributed to a 
decline in the importance of religion. Interestingly however, Fox also finds that ethnic conflicts are 
more likely to be combined with religious motives, and that ethno-religious conflicts are slightly 
more intense (read: only slightly deadlier) but tend to last considerably longer than non-religious 
ethnic wars5. Finally, Fox’s work reveals that “by far the most common type of conflict is conflict 
between two Christian groups,” outnumbering conflicts between Muslim groups (2004a.) This 
finding is consistent with De Soysa and Nordås’s work, which also attempts to show empirically 
that conflict between Christian groups is more common than between Muslims (De Soysa et 
al., 2007.) However, Fox’s analysis also suggests that Islamic groups engage in more inter-religious 
conflict (though Christians seem to trail them by only a slight margin.) In all, these results appear 
to contradict or at least qualify Huntington’s assertion regarding the conspicuous “bloodiness” of 
Islam.  
For all the merits of Fox’s quantitative tests, however, they also face serious shortcomings. First, 
Fox’s use of the State Failure dataset (and until 1996,) which only covers domestic conflicts, severely 
limits the claims he makes, particularly since much of the recent political controversy (sparked by 
the Al Qaeda attacks) has focused on international inter-faith wars. Second, as he readily admits 
in his articles, these broad correlations do not prove causation. Absent in his work is a discussion 
of the theoretical mechanisms connecting religion to conflict, and as such, his findings are only 
inferentially suggestive. In other words, he lacks a theory of the religion and conflict nexus. Finally, 
and perhaps most damningly, Fox’s conceptualization and measurement of religious conflict seems 
suspect, if not outright inadequate: His analysis conceptualizes religious conflict as that waged by 
groups belonging to/identifying with different religions. But does mere identification with a given 
religion necessarily make a conflict religious? The answer should be no, or at least not necessarily. 
Rather, it would seem more appropriate to conceptualize, and to count as religious, those conflicts 
in which religions plays either a key or relatively important role, and in which religious motives, 
causes or goals are professed and mobilized. 
More recently, Monica Duffy Toft has also joined the debate regarding the impact of religion on 
war. In a number of important works, Duffy Toft has reported empirical support for the hypothesis 
that stresses the rise of religion’s importance in conflict trends (Duffy Toft, 2006, 2007.) Armed 
4 See http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ 
5 The complications and implications of this overlap will be considered later in this article.
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with an original dataset, Duffy Toft finds that out of 133 civil wars that took place between 1940 
and 2000, 42 were religiously-based. Additionally, in a helpful conceptual and empirical move 
(that addresses my earlier critique of Fox,) Duffy Toft codes wars in which religion was either a 
central or a peripheral component. By central Duffy Toft denotes wars in which combatants were 
fighting over whether a state or region should be ruled according to a specific religion. Peripheral 
refers to conflicts where combatants identified with a specific religious tradition and grouped 
themselves accordingly, but where the rule of a specific religious tradition could not be considered 
the object of their contention (Duffy Toft, 2006: 9.) With this in mind, she finds that out of the 42 
cases, religion was central in 25 of those conflicts, and peripheral in 17. 
In addition, Duffy Toft shows that there has indeed been an increase in the proportion of religious 
civil wars in the last half-century or so. She explains: “From the 1940s to the 1950s, the figure rose 
from 19 to 29 percent. The 1960s witnessed a modest decline to 21 percent, but the figure grew 
in the 1970s to 36 percent and continued to climb in the 1980s to 39 percent and into the 1990s 
to 43 percent. Religious civil wars also make up a disproportionate number of ongoing wars after 
2000. There were 14 ongoing wars as of 2000. Of these, 7 (or 50 percent) were religious” (Duffy 
Toft, 2006: 9.) These findings appear to contradict Fox’s assertion that the rise of religious conflict 
relative to other types of conflict was negligible.
As for the influence of particular religions on civil wars, again unlike Fox (2004a, 2004b) and De 
Soysa and Nordås (2007,) Duffy Toft finds that Islam was the most prevalent faith to engage in 
conflict: “One or both parties adhered to Islam in 81 percent of all religious civil wars (32 of 42 
cases); Christianity was involved in 21 (50 percent); Hinduism in 6 cases (14 percent); and other 
religions in just a handful” (Duffy Toft, 2006: 12.)  Her data reveals that Islam is also the most 
involved religion in intrafaith wars (with 9 out of 10 cases) though in interfaith conflicts, both Islam 
and Christianity seem equally well represented (25 cases or 78 percent for Islam, and 22 cases or 
69 percent for Christianity.) 
Interestingly, however, Duffy Toft suggests her data disproves Huntington’s clash of civilizations 
thesis, in that there has not been an increase in the rise of interreligious conflicts since the 1940s—
rather, they have represented around one-fourth of total conflicts across the last six decades. 
Duffy Toft’s research also refers to other important aspects of the religion and violent conflict 
debate. She finds that religious wars outlast others by a two-year margin, and that those in which 
religion is “peripheral” last longer. In regards to the settlement of religious wars, unsurprisingly, 
she finds (like Fox) that those in which faith is “central” are twice as less likely to be resolved via 
a negotiated settlement, in comparison to those in which it is “peripheral.” Her findings on war 
recurrence are similar to these, but in regards to deadliness, she finds that they are four times 
more intense.
To summarize, Duffy Toft finds that: “First, religious civil wars make up more than one-third of 
all civil wars fought from 1940 to 2000, and there is little sign that this trend will wane any time 
soon. Second, among the world’s major religions, Islam was involved in just over 80 percent of 
these civil wars. Third, religious civil wars in some instances are more costly than nonreligious 
civil wars: they last longer, and when religion is central, they are more intractable and are deadlier 
to noncombatants than wars in which religion is peripheral” (Duffy Toft, 2006: 12.)
4 See http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ 
5 The complications and implications of this overlap will be considered later in this article.
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On balance, Duffy Toft’s participation in the empirical debate has been helpful. Importantly, 
as noted, she addresses the shortcomings of Fox’s work regarding both the conceptualization of 
religious conflict and the key differences between central and peripheral influence of religious 
motives and goals. Combined, though, both Fox and Duffy Toft empirically show that religion 
has in fact played an increasing role in the waging of war -a trend that shows no sign of decline-, 
and present revealing results regarding the relative endurance and deadliness of wars involving 
religious groups. In addition, both scholars’ work confirms the prominent role of Islam vis-à-vis 
other faiths in both domestic and international conflict, which opens up a series of interesting 
puzzles and avenues for research. 
The limits of this work are in part due to limits in the data that is currently available. As noted above, 
these studies place their focus on a relative short span of time, roughly since the mid-twentieth 
century. As illustrated throughout, though helpful for addressing current debates sparked by both 
secularization theories as well as by Huntington’s argument, this body of empirical work could be 
fruitfully complemented with data that looks further back into history to assess the origins of the 
trends identified by these scholars. In addition, having established major trends and correlations 
that solidly connect religion to violent intrastate and interstate wars, future work should aim to 
discriminate between different types of conflict, ranging from smaller scale clashes  (pogroms and 
riots, for example,) to communal violence and other expressions of violence, short of full-blown 
civil war. This line of work can be best pursued both quantitatively and qualitatively: On the one 
hand, Fox’s and Duffy Toft’s broad trends should be broken down with the use more fine-grained 
typology of violent outcomes in existing datasets, and qualitative case studies should be built (and 
extant ones could be harnessed) to identify the causal and constitutive mechanisms connecting 
religion to different types of conflict.
II. Why Is God Deadly? Theories of Religion and War
Empirical studies have proven that religion matters in the occurrence of war. But how and why does 
it matter? What factors influence its impact? This section reviews the major theoretical approaches 
to the impact of religion on violent conflict.
Major theoretical approaches to the religion-conflict nexus
In a 2000 article, Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger review the tradition of scholarly work 
on religion and violence, slicing it up along three major approaches: primordialism, instrumentalism 
and constructivism (Hasenclever et al, 2000.) Below I present the main traits of each “camp,” as 
highlighted by Hasenclever and Rittberger:
1) Primordialists, spearheaded by figures such as Huntington (though Gilles Kepel and Jeffrey 
Seul, among others, are also included here) argue that there are intrinsic elements within religious 
traditions that propel the explosion of violence, and that such elements are so deeply ingrained 
that intolerance toward other religions will almost inevitably arise, ultimately leading to violent 
conflict. The scholarly emphasis here is usually placed on the so-called “religions of the book”: 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, though Huntington included a number of other “civilizations” 
in his list of warring cultures. Hasenclever and Rittberger explain that “according to the 
primordialist perspective, the reorganization of world politics will be accompanied by civil unrest 
and international wars. Domestically, non-Western civilizations will purge themselves from the 
remnants of the Cold War era. Religious militants face, and take up, the task of either ousting 
westernized political elites from power or converting their members into zealous believers, who 
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recant secularism and devote themselves to building political institutions that protect and promote 
the religious traditions of their nations” (Hasenclever et al, 2000: 643.) This belligerent dynamic is 
also said to escalate internationally, thus leading to civilizational conflicts. 
2) Instrumentalists, for their part, hold a less essentialist view of the relationship between religion 
and conflict. For them conflict between religions erupts not because of intrinsic doctrinal reasons 
but because religion offers a particularly viable resource for political leaders and elites to tap 
onto and mask a more fundamental interest: pursuing greater power and wealth. Conflicts that 
appear to be motivated by religious or doctrinal causes are rather fundamentally triggered by 
socioeconomic divergences and inequality, both within and between states. As such, they argue 
that the radicalization of religious groups “is more likely to occur in times of economic decay, 
social disintegration or state collapse” (Hasenclever et al, 2000: 645.) Domestically, socioeconomic 
grievances are said to spark social unrest among populations living in poverty, which leads them to 
find an “alternative orders” in religious communities to satisfy their need for welfare, security and 
recognition. Political leaders in these states recognize such unrest and, faced with an opportunity 
to increase their political capital, seize the opportunity to use religious arguments that effectively 
mobilize crowds. 
Internationally, instrumentalist approaches posit that rational utility-maximizing leaders will resort 
to religious scripts to build alliances with co-religionist states when the economic and military 
incentives they offer are great. However, should other states that do not profess the same religion 
offer larger benefits than said co-religionists, rational leaders will have no qualms in prioritizing 
alliances with those states. 
Put otherwise, for instrumentalists, religion is a resource to be tapped to reap political and 
economic gains, but is only one among many. As a result, though instrumentalists allocate religion 
some importance in precipitating mobilization and facilitating alliance-building by shrewd self-
interested leaders, at the end of the day religion is seen as a proxy variable for understanding the 
deeper motives driving violent conflict. 
The study of suicide terrorism is a good example of the instrumentalist approach. In a widely 
influential study, Robert Pape argues that suicide terrorism follows a “strategic logic” that aims to 
extract short-term, usually territorial, gains from liberal democracies (Pape 2003, 2005.) Using cross-
case quantitative data and case studies on a number of conflicts, including Sri Lanka, Lebanon, 
Israel-Palestine and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, Pape contends that “suicide terrorism is on 
the rise” because terrorists have learned that “it pays.” Importantly, Pape plays down the effect of 
religious motives, or in his words, “fanaticism” to explain suicide bombings. Though he recognizes 
that this conclusion, produced by scholarly work in the 1980s was “consistent with the data from 
that period,” he also notes that later cases have confirmed that suicide terrorism is not limited to 
Islamic Fundamentalism (Pape, 2003: 343.)
Religious motives may be invoked, but at the core of terrorism lay the thirst for territorial and 
political gains. What is the strategic goal of terrorism, then? According to Pape, suicide bombers 
aim to coerce the opponent into making territorial concessions. As such, Pape argues, these tactics 
are not the result of “fanatical” or irrational fighters, but rather are carefully deployed, connected 
to nationalist claims, and selective in its targets. Stathis Kalyvas has made a similar argument 
about the massacres in Algeria (Kalyvas, 1999.) 
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3) Constructivism represents the third main approach to the impact of religion on conflict. For 
scholars writing in this theoretical vein, religion constitutes not a proxy or “mask” variable, but 
rather represents a powerful cognitive structure consisting “of shared understandings, expectations, 
and social knowledge, [which] provide[s] social actors with value-laden conceptions of the self and 
others, and consequently affect[s] their strategic choices” (Hasenclever et al, 2000: 648.) In addition, 
religion is neither intrinsically belligerent nor always readily accessible to the instrumental needs 
of greedy elites. Rather, religious doctrine offers a wide net of inter-subjective understandings and 
scripts over which interpretational battles are fought, and as such, attention should be placed on the 
contest of interpretational frames and strategies (and those who put them forth) for understanding 
both the peaceful and the violent impact of religion in politics. 
Note, however, that constructivists do not disagree with instrumentalists on the fact that religion is 
susceptible of factoring into the interests of leaders, or on the idea that political entrepreneurship 
is needed to mobilize crowd support based on religious arguments. However, as Hasenclever and 
Rittberger note, constructivists do disagree with the instrumentalist tendency to see religion as a 
mask of deeper, material interests. Instead, they attempt to take doctrine more seriously and argue 
that it can, by virtue of the mobilization power granted by its own cognitive force, lead to violent 
outcomes. 
Constructivists also disagree with instrumentalist approaches on the ease with which leaders (in 
the latter’s viewpoint) galvanize societal support: for constructivists, political leaders must engage 
in processes of persuasive social legitimation via the interpretation and reinterpretation of religious 
doctrine to achieve mass mobilization, a task in which they usually face contending frames and 
interpretations that do not instigate violence. Scott Appleby’s argument about the “ambivalence 
of the sacred”, presented later in more detail, illustrates this line of research well: different 
interpretations and framing enterprises of religious doctrine may lead to war or to peace, to clash 
or to dialogue (Appleby, 1999.)
Seizing a Middle Ground: Eclectic Approaches
Hasenclever and Rittberger’s theoretical overview is extremely helpful in teasing out the differences 
between major social scientific approaches to the study of religion and violence. However, a 
closer reading of some of the most recent studies on religion and violence reveals that the above 
picture of clearly demarcated theoretical camps is a highly stylized one. Some of the same authors 
referenced above, particular Duffy Toft, Hasenclever and Rittberger, or Daniel Philpott, as well 
as sociological works such as those by Appleby and Marty, fuse instrumentalist and constructivist 
tools in their explanatory frameworks. In this subsection I aim to illustrate the “eclecticism” that 
characterizes the arguments of these authors, and which I argue is increasingly becoming the 
conventional wisdom in the subfield of religion and violent conflict.
First, a few lines are necessary on what I mean by this “eclecticism.” Social science research, 
including in Political Science, and within it specific subfields such as International Relations and 
Comparative Politics, has traditionally been divided along two broad meta-theoretical positions: 
rationalism and constructivism. As explained in the section above, rationalists focus on political 
actors and their strategic interests, usually said to be geared toward the maximization of their 
utility function (determined by a cost/benefit calculus). Though “thin” and “thick” variants of 
rationalism exist, the version that has usually gained more currency among scholars, perhaps 
following a market bias, has been associated rationalism with materialism and the attainment of 
wealth and power. 
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The other meta-theory of social action is constructivism, which, as explained earlier in reference to 
Hasenclever and Rittberger, takes actors’ ideas and beliefs more seriously, and uses them not only 
to understand how said actors’ “interests,” strategies and identities are constituted and are subject 
to change over time via actors’ interaction. 
Scholarly practice has usually treated these two meta-theories as radically and mutually exclusive, 
and indeed many academic debates (and careers) have been built on a “dueling theories” approach 
to social science. However, recently, more scholars have become skeptical about the impermeability 
of the divide between these two camps, and have introduced into the debate the idea that 
rationalism and constructivism may be combined regardless of whether core philosophical and 
epistemological questions remain unresolved. As such, James Fearon and Alexander Wendt (2002) 
and more recently Katzenstein and Sil (2008, 2010) have promoted pursuing a “pragmatic” and 
“eclectic” route of research that combines the major insights from both approaches to produce more 
persuasive scholarly work. As Katzenstein and Sil explain: “Analytic eclecticism is distinguished 
by the fact that features of analyses in theories initially embedded in separate research traditions can be 
separated from their respective foundations, translated meaningfully, and recombined as part of an original 
permutation of concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics.” (Katzenstein et al., 2008: 111.) This pragmatic 
turn to eclecticism is now hailed as the new mantra of the International Relations subfield, and key 
figures are trying to promote it as a sort of academic best practice. 
Such enthusiasm, naturally, does not mean automatic uptake by the broader scholarly community, 
and as such, the turn to eclectic theorizing remains work in progress. In what follows, however, 
I want to argue that the subfield of religion and conflict reviewed here (if perhaps not the larger 
subfield of religion and politics) seems to have made this “eclectic” turn, insofar as many of the 
main theories currently held by major scholars incorporate insights and tools from both rationalism 
and constructivism. A distillation of the arguments of the scholarly camps discussed earlier helps 
to flesh out my point. 
First, it must be said that primordialism has been widely discarded as a valid explanation of the 
religion and conflict nexus. This is the case, I would argue, for two possible reasons. One the 
one hand, it appears to be factually unsound. As the empirical work by Fox and Duffy Toft 
presented earlier show,6 no single religion accounts for all religious conflict around the world, and 
in particular, Christians and Muslims share an important slice of the existing cases.7 As a result, 
there is nothing intrinsic about Islam (or Christianity, or any other religion) that makes it more 
conflict prone, which, however, does not mean there may not be other factors (which Toft dubs 
“structural”) that may explain Islam’s larger share in both inter and intrafaith conflicts around the 
globe. On the other hand, it may simply be politically incorrect -indeed, politically dangerous- to 
single out any major religion as essentially and inevitably violence-prone.
Setting aside primordialism, three key factors are identified in the existing religion-and-violence 
literature: the strong sense of community in religious groups; religious doctrine; and the role 
of leadership in violent religious mobilization. These three factors correspond roughly to the 
variables central to constructivism and rationalism: identity, ideas, on the one hand, and strategic 
interaction on the other. Yet, as seen below, mono-causal arguments using any single one of these 
6 The comparative case studies built by sociologists also share this trait of exploring a wide variety of religions.
7 And any historically-minded scholar will make sure to remember,  alongside the recent surge of Islam-driven violence,  the perfidy of 
the Christian Crusades. 
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variables are rarely persuasive. Indeed, my survey of the literature suggests an emerging scholarly 
consensus on the idea that separately, though necessary, neither one of these traits is expected to 
be a sufficient cause of religious violence. As a result, rather than a rivalry between approaches, a 
combinatory approach may be the best route. Taking this eclectic perspective, different scholars 
have opted either to present mid-level hypotheses or to build broader interpretive frames to 
understand the religion and conflict nexus, and explain violent outcomes. Let us explore those 
arguments in turn.
How do religious group membership, religious doctrine and leadership combine and lead to 
conflict? In an important 2007 article, Daniel Philpott identifies a series of pathways (Philpott, 
2007.) Based on constructivist insights, Philpott agrees that religion offers an ideal and powerful 
“cognitive” set of scripts through which mass support can be mobilized around religious identity. 
Group membership in religious communities, which usually rest on strong ties of brother- and 
sisterhood, may lead to in- and out-group dynamics that characterize social life generally and 
derive in violent clashes with believers of different faiths or against secularists. As Philpott argues: 
religion “shapes the identities and loyalties of warring communities – Serbs, Northern Irish 
Loyalists, or Buddhist Sinhalese” (Philpott, 2007: 518.) However, Philpott suggests that the actual 
doctrine of specific religions plays little role in this pathway—what matters more here is the use of 
religious language and symbols to “inflame the bellicosity of communities whose faith had come 
‘folk religion’—theologically desiccated, but rich in ritual, lore and ethnicity” (Philpott, 2007: 518.)
For her part, as Duffy Toft (2006) notes, most major religions share a latent “defense of the religious 
community” component, that is, the idea that a believer’s most important goal in life is to preserve 
his/her faith and community from threats or attacks by outsiders, which, if activated, may have the 
effect of radicalizing the behavior of co-religionists. A corollary of this is that a radicalized belief 
in the need to defend one’s religion may lead believers to discount their fear of death, which would 
explain phenomena such as suicide terrorism. 
For Philpott then, the above combination of factors (community and leadership, and doctrine, if 
only superficially) represents a first pathway of religiously-activated conflict: a strong feeling of 
attachment to a religious identity that is tapped onto by embattled political leaders who see it as 
a potent resource for mobilization. This pathway provides scholars such as Duffy Toft with the 
grounds to propose a more concrete theory to explain cases in when religion goes from peripheral 
to central in a conflict, which she dubs “religious outbidding” (inspired in Jack Snyder’s work 
on nationalist wars.) As she explains: “The logic of [my] argument is that because the intangible 
benefits of religiously approved conduct outweigh the tangible costs of bargaining, combatants 
may refuse to bargain and continue to fight, especially because in religious traditions such as 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, a conflict outcome is often considered a manifestation of God’s 
will, and violent conflict itself is therefore transmuted into a test of religious faith” (Duffy Toft, 
2006: 26.) Note that this explanation combines constitutive, that is, constructivist notions, as well 
as rationalist ones: once a strong religious identity has been constituted it is easier for threatened 
leaders to mobilize believers to fight –and die- for their faith. It must be noted that for scholars 
such as Duffy Toft, this approach (that I call eclectic) takes the wind from claims regarding the 
irrationality of religious violence. As she argues, “Religious actors are actually rational, but they 
base their utility calculations on intangible values” (Duffy Toft, 2006: 27.) Toft uses the cases of the 
First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars to test her theory, but more qualitative work beyond those 
cases remains to be done to ascertain, via process tracing and controlled comparisons, the causal 
link that her theory suggests.
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Philpott proposes a second pathway, which appears to take faith more seriously. In certain cases, 
he suggests, religious doctrine may not only help define the identities of the groups engaged in 
violence, but also their ulterior goals regarding political order. In what he dubs the “integrationist” 
nature of some religious causes, certain political theologies (and interpretations thereof) lead groups 
and their supporters to discriminate against other, often minority, groups.8 This integrationist 
quality appears to have been shared by many conflict cases involving Islam. Duffy Toft seems 
to agree with Philpott in her analysis of interpretations surrounding the notion of jihad as a 
“structural-institutional” cause of Islam-related violence (Duffy Toft, 2007.) In addition, Toft also 
offers an additional historical-structural factor for the higher prevalence of Islam in recent conflict 
trends, suggesting that in comparison to Christianity, Islam has not undergone a systematic process 
of differentiation between religion and state (Duffy Toft 2007: 21-24.) This analysis is shared by 
Philpott, who notes that many Muslim-majority states have adopted a statist-repressive approach to 
Islamic ideas and groups, initially forcing them into illegality but ultimately –in a sort of feedback 
loop- also prompting “revivalist” radicalized movements which aim to rule in accordance to their 
radical reading of Muslim doctrine. There are also cases (Iran being the foremost) in which such 
movements have succeed in capturing the state and pursue integrationist agendas, making them 
more “conflict-prone” (Philpott, 2007: 519.)
As a corollary to this second pathway, Philpott notes that in some conflicts, religious ends may 
combine with other strong cognitive structures such as ethnicity and nationalism. Such are 
the cases of the Sudan and Sri Lanka. Finally, Philpott also notes that “integrationist” political 
theologies sometimes also play a role in shaping the identities and goals of opposition groups. This 
combinatory approach, as is evident, also contains institutionalist elements to explain variance in 
violent and non-violent outcomes, not unlike the approach taken by Fearon and Laitin in the study 
of inter-ethnic (non-)cooperation (Fearon and Laitin, 1996.) 
For their part, Hasenclever and Rittberger offer a similarly “eclectic” theory of religious mobilization 
leading to conflict. Like Duffy Toft, they focus on the choices of elites, seen as rational actors who 
calculate the costs and benefits of resorting to religious arguments in order to incite supporters 
toward violence. Importantly, elites’ decisions are determined by the likelihood of mobilization 
success. Following a rationalist logic, they suggest that “controlling for the strength of the adversary, 
the prospects of success, in turn, are a function of at least two variables: (1) the mobilization of the 
rank and file and (2) the support that the group’s goals and strategies enjoy within the broader 
society. As a result, “we should expect elite’s choices to be affected by the degree of support they 
can muster for their cause and their strategies.” (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 651.) What 
affects the likelihood that elites’ mobilization strategies will succeed, and what determines public 
support for those goals and strategies? They point to four factors connected to religion: 
o Because religious conflicts constitute struggles over deeply held values rather than economic 
interests or other types of social preferences, there is a greater likelihood that members will 
mobilize violently to defend their faith.
o Leaders making decisions to encourage violence among their followers need to consider 
whether their supporters will have a tendency to have self-sacrificing attitudes. Religious 
attachment, as mentioned earlier, has a tendency to increase believers’ will to sacrifice to 
defend their cause.
8 Philpott defines “political theology” as the set of ideas that a religious body holds about legitimate political authority (2007: 511.)
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o The fewer cooperative strategies appear available for attaining the group’s goals, the greater 
the likelihood that elites will choose violent options. When peaceful options have been 
exhausted or there is a history of animosity between groups, leaders may find in religion a 
potent and effective catalyst for violent action.
o Leaders must weight the likelihood that their framing of the struggle in religious terms and 
the suggestion of violent conduct will be find echo in their rank-and-file. Leaders must then 
engage in persuasive framing of their cause “in terms that lend credibility to their claim that 
violence is unavoidable.”
This model, like Toft’s and Philpott’s, combines a constructivist approach to the formation of 
interests and preferences to mobilize crowds toward conflict, with rationalist strategizing on the 
part of elite actors. 
Finally, let me briefly discuss the work of sociologists Martin Marty and Scott Appleby. In an 
impressive series of volumes framed around a broader research project, Marty and Appleby, 
with the aid of dozens of contributors, including political scientist Gabriel Almond and historian 
Emmanuel Sivan, developed a collection of comparative historical case studies in order to construct 
an interpretive framework of fundamentalism, covering a diversity of religions and regions in the 
world. They define fundamentalism, essentially, as a “reactive and defensive [stance] toward the 
processes and consequences of secularization and modernization.” (Appleby and Marty 2004: 405.) 
Fundamentalists are groups of believers in a particular faith who, concerned with “the erosion 
and displacement of true religion,” react to it in a variety of ways, both violent and non-violent 
(Appleby and Marty 2004: 405.)
This ambitious project culminated with the 2004 volume entitled Fundamentalism Comprehended, 
which offers extremely rich insights regarding the diversity of fundamentalist groups and the 
multiplicity of factors that give rise to it in its various forms. Importantly, Almond, Sivan and 
Appleby suggest three set of causes for fundamentalism: (1) structural factors related to long term 
contextual conditions and changes; (2) contingent, chance factors; and (3) human factors of choice 
and leadership. Though the participants of this volume aim to arrive at a explanatory framework of 
fundamentalism, the extraordinary diversity and complexity of the subject (and the level of detail 
they obtain via a plethora of controlled case studies) lead them to produce not a parsimonious 
theory of fundamentalism but rather a list of factors that enable its appearance, consisting of no 
less than eleven structural causes, which they then couple with contingency and leadership. 
Depending on the scholarly standards one embraces this is either an advantage or a hindrance: 
Is it better to have an astoundingly layered study containing broad typologies and strategies that 
cover multiple religions and regions or is it preferable to arrive at and propose concrete hypotheses 
or theoretical combinations that explain specific outcomes? Political scientists and sociologists of 
differing epistemological sensibilities will probably take diverse views here. In any case, from the 
description provided above it the reader can appreciate that there is a deal of overlap between 
the aspects considered by political scientists such as Duffy Toft, Philpott or Hasenclever and 
Rittberger, and sociologists as those involved in the Fundamentalism project, to the extent that 
they include elements from both doctrine and strategic behavior on the side of political leaders in 
their explanatory frameworks. 
It must be noted, however, that the Fundamentalist Comprehended volume does not zoom specifically 
into the subject of inquiry of this article regarding the impact of religion on violence. This is not 
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to say that the connection does not pervade the endeavor-- quite to the contrary. For instance, the 
volume does offer a helpful typology of fundamentalist groups and strategies according to the 
group’s relationship to their immediate environment: world conqueror, world transformer, world creator 
and world renouncer. From these, the first two appear as the most prone to engage in violence. As 
Almond, Sivan and Appleby state: “The primary strategy of the world conqueror is to assume 
control of the structures of society which have given life to the enemy” (Almond et al., 2004: 428.) 
In the case of the “world transformer”, these authors suggest that “a second means of abolishing 
the enemy is to reinterpret and influence the structures, institutions, laws and practices of a society, 
so that opposing fundamentalism my become more difficult, and so that conditions become 
more favorable for the conversion or marginalization of the enemy” (Almond et al., 2004: 428.) 
These categories are used throughout the book and connected by the authors to specific cases of 
religziously-inspired violence.
In his solitary work, however, Scott Appleby does tackle the question of religion and violence 
more directly. Despite the fact that, again, his approach is more interpretive than explanatory, 
he offers ideas that coincide with the models and pathways proposed by Philpott or Duffy Toft: 
community, doctrine and leadership. First, his very definition of fundamentalism contains these 
elements: “Fundamentalism… refers to a specifiable pattern of religious militancy by which self-
styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the 
religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular structures and processes” (Appleby, 
2000: 86.) Appleby goes further, and differentiating fundamentalism from extremism, he connects 
them to explain violent outcomes via the interpretational powers of group leaders. He says: “The 
scrupulous observance of the divine law can become an ideological and operational resource for 
extremists… The ability of religion to inspire ecstasy stands behind the distinctive logic of religious 
violence. As unpredictable and illogical as this violence may seem to outsiders, it falls within a 
pattern of ascetism leading to the ecstasy of self-sacrifice that runs as a continuous threat through 
most religions” (Appleby, 2000: 91.) In his analysis, as in the ones presented earlier by political 
scientists, religion and religious doctrine serves to construct the identities and interests of the 
believers (which as in those theories can also mix with other cognitive scripts such as nationalism or 
ethnicity,) but the presence of a leader that frames doctrine to mobilize militant member is crucial 
(Appleby explores the influence of Sayyid Qutb on fundamentalist Islam and his interpretation 
of the notion of jihad.) He falls short of suggesting an explicit model, but in my view, his insights 
here, as well as collectively with Marty and others, contain the same –constructivist and rationalist- 
elements to constitute “eclectic theorizing” in the area of studies of fundamentalism.
III. Assessing the Literature
Thus far I have evaluated positively recent work put forth by both political scientists and sociologists 
combining rationalist and constructivist lenses. But what are some weaknesses of this scholarship? 
What remains to be done?
To begin with, for all the merits of the combinatory approach, one wonders whether existing 
theories take religious doctrine seriously enough. Faith here plays a distinctive role because it 
serves as particularly powerful “glue” for group identity, one colored with certain scripts (of self-
sacrifice, for example) which then may make resorting to violence more likely. However, these 
scripts still need to be activated and formulated by leaders that mobilize crowds of believers, 
usually in the face of a threat (by secularists or non-believers) or for self-interested reasons (the 
pursuit of power and wealth.) Critical scholars such as Roxanne Euben have raised doubts about 
the functionalist tone of much work on religion, particularly on Islamic fundamentalism, which 
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plays into secularization theory by framing religious motives as inherently reactive to modernity 
(Euben, 1999.) Though this critique applies more forcefully to instrumentalist arguments and 
particularly to theories propounding for the “irrationality” of religious motives, one wonders 
whether the “mobilization approach” put forth by most “eclectic” accounts is also guilty of this 
charge and thus, as Euben argues (citing Lawrence,) fail “to take account of the autonomous 
nature of the religious impulse” (Euben, 1999: 24.) Can religion be understood as anything other 
than providing fertile ground for the activation of masses toward particular objectives (violent 
or non-violent)? This is a major question that I do not intend to answer here, but one that future 
research in political theory and comparative politics should take up.
A critique of the mobilization approach that sustains major theories of religion and conflict can 
be waged from a more positivist standpoint. Though religious group identity and doctrine are 
present in the prevailing explanatory models of religion and violent conflict, it is ultimately the 
interpretative power and the strategic action of leaders (be they political elites or minority leaders) 
that ultimately triggers the conduct of believers. As a result, though not the sole causal factor in 
these models, leadership appears as the prime mover. For scholars seeking to come to causally 
parsimonious explanations, the role of leadership as a constant (rather as a variable) in existing 
models of religion and conflict may be problematic. This type of criticism has also been leveled 
at the broader literature on social movements. As Charles Tilly notes in his foreword to a volume 
on Islamic Activism: 
“As I see it, the apparatus of mobilizing structures, political opportunities, repertoires, frames and contentious action 
can never serve as more than an orienting device for the sorting of observations that investigators will then have to 
explain by other means. As a horde of critics have complained without much effect, no one has identified powerful 
empirical regularities or compelling causal models that account or all sorts of political opportunity structures, 
framing processes, or sequences of political mobilization. Regularities and explanatory principles operate at the 
level of mechanisms and processes, not at the level of these descriptive categories.” (Tilly, 2004: xi.) 
One way to address this problem may be to develop studies that analyze cases that present similar 
conditions but lead to different outcomes, that is, to compare cases of successful and failed violent 
religious mobilization. Another way to proceed is to take Duffy Toft’s approach by proposing 
hypotheses about concrete sequences or causal chains connecting religion to violence and 
subjecting them to careful empirical testing across cases. Qualitative methods (process-tracing, 
controlled comparisons, etc.) may result most fruitful here. Furthermore, in addition specifying 
precise causal chains, scholars of religion and conflict should look to make clearer statements 
about the conditions under which their causal mechanisms and models lead to violent or non-
violent outcomes. Much can be drawn from existing work: As mentioned earlier, Appleby and 
Marty’s volume offers an extremely extensive list of structural variables, including regime type, 
education levels, the role of mass communication, or differences in social structures and civil 
society density, that seem to matter in the mobilization of fundamentalist groups. This plethora of 
structural variables can be mined to produce more specific hypotheses and theories to see how 
well they apply to specific cases or sets thereof. 
In addition, as mentioned in the first section of this article, scholars should aim to distinguish 
between types of violent outcomes in terms of their scale, duration, “bloodiness,” among others. 
For example, much current work focuses –unsurprisingly- on fundamentalist terrorist groups, but 
wide controversy remains in regards to the relevance and the specific effect of religion. Pape argues 
that terrorists are strategic, rational actors, and that even when it does appears to be relevant, 
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religion is usually proxy variable masking territorial gains. However, other authors such as Fawas 
Gerges, Quintan Wiktorowicz and Simon Haddad question this thesis from different perspectives, 
which suggests that a more careful consideration of religious doctrine as constitutive is needed for 
a fuller understanding of suicide terrorism (Gerges, 2005; Haddad et al. 2002; Wiktorowicz, 2003.) 
Indeed, one wonders to what extent Pape’s own argument should necessarily exclude the use of 
constructivist insights. One way of combining approaches is to analytically separate the “strategic” 
(i.e. rational) and the “constitutive” (i.e. constructivist) role of religion as they apply in mobilization 
dynamic involved in these models. Indeed, one could hypothesize that in some cases, the leaders 
that mobilize groups to pursue terrorist goals are themselves the strategic actors with clear short-
term utility-maximizing goals, but that believers themselves, the mobilized, are constituted by the 
cognitive power of the interpretations of religious doctrine promoted by their leaders, and as such, 
are subject to constructivist mechanisms. Along these lines, using survey research, Haddad and 
Khashan have suggested that support of terrorism in areas such as Lebanon or Palestine is strongly 
linked to an attachment to political Islam (Haddad et al., 2002.)
The relationship between rationalism and constructivism in the study of suicide terrorism 
could also work in a more fundamental way. For example, rather than separating the motives 
of leaders and believers, Wiktorowicz and others have argued that for some of these religious 
groups, including Al Qaeda, religion can act as the criterion for “utility-maximization.”9 That is, 
rather than material, territorial or economic goals, what extremist groups pursue is precisely the 
exaltation of their religious belief-based mandate, with the purpose of furthering the strength of 
their community vis-à-vis other competing worldviews and orders (Wiktorowicz et al., 2006.) This 
is a controversial approach to rationality, because some may argue that separating materialism 
from rationalism may prevent scholars from meaningfully differentiating between “ideational” 
and “material” motives, but the epistemological jury is still out, which means the debate should 
be carried further.
In addition, Pape’s argument about the fact that suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic 
fundamentalists, while relevant perhaps for general theory of terrorism, does not mean the link 
between religion and terrorism is not worthy of exploration in and of itself. That is, while it is 
obvious that terrorism is not strictly religiously-based across the board, for scholars in this subfield, 
understanding the cases, motives and dynamics of the cases where religion does seem to play a 
role, is still a goal worth pursuing.10 Finally, connections between Pape’s argument regarding the 
central role of nationalism raises doubts as to whether, in many of the explored cases, nationalism 
and religiosity, along with ethnicity, combine to produce violent outcomes, as noted for example, 
by Daniel Philpott.
9 Duffy Toft,  in the work reviewed here,  takes this position.
10 Though not explicitly engaged with debates about religion and terrorism,  recent work by Max Abrahms has argued,  contra Pape and 
others,  that what drives terrorism is not a “strategic” utility-maximizing logic,  but rather is explained by the maximization of “solidarity 
ties.” Though still recent and underdeveloped,  this type of organizational approach to terrorism may easily be integrated with other 
arguments about the force of religious community and identity ties and the conditions under which they may lead to violent outcomes. 
Marty and Appleby,  in the conclusions to their edited volume,  highlight the importance of organizational factors for the actions of 
fundamentalist groups. This line of work merits further attention also because organizations traits and dynamics have become key 
explanatory variables for explaining patterns of combatant violence during civil war. See Abrahms 2006,  2008,  and Weinstein,  2007 
on civil war.
11 The work of Stuart Kaufman is an excellent example of an “eclectic” approach to ethnic conflict that may be connected to these 
reflections on religion and violence. See Kaufman,  2001.
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This brings me to a final issue to which I have admittedly not devoted much space in this literature 
review: What is the relationship between religion, ethnicity and nationalism as motivations or 
factors accounting for violent conflict? Given the prevalence of conflicts that combine these 
“cognitive schemas” (as seen in Fox’s quantitative trends, but also in the work of Duffy Toft, Philpott 
and even Pape,) how fruitful is it to try to separate them analytically? Can this type of delinking 
be made persuasively at all? As presented by Ashtoush Varshney is his review of the subfield 
of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, similar approaches (primordialist, instrumentalist, constructivist 
and institutionalist) have been put forth by scholars in that subarea, in part because in many 
accounts religion has been taken as a proxy variable for ethnicity, or acting in combination with it 
(Varshney, 2007.) Yet, as this literature review attests, a small body of work has surfaced that has 
“taken religion seriously” as a potentially independent factor. 
How can progress on this front be made then? In cases where ethno-religious motives combine, 
privileging one schema while “ignoring” or displacing the other seems like the least desirable 
option, and framing them as “competing” variables appears equally unpersuasive. One option is 
to take a more inductive approach -again via the use of single or controlled comparison of case 
studies- to elucidate the ways in which elements from both interact or not to produce different 
outcomes, to identify the conditions under which one schema becomes more relevant than the 
other in the explosion of violent outcomes. 
In sum, as has become evident in this essay, the study of religion and conflict is burgeoning in the 
social sciences, with scholars from different disciplines participating in the debate. My argument 
throughout has been that, at least within Political Science, there appears to be a theoretical 
convergence toward the combination of rationalist and constructivist approaches. On balance, 
however, it is as of yet unclear whether the existing work on the religion and conflict constitutes 
a carefully delineated research program.12 However, as I have aimed to illustrate, solid bases 
have been established. Certain theories, particularly primordialism, seem to have been widely 
discarded. What is needed now is perhaps a more specific, consensual agenda to substantiate and 
qualify broad trends, and this seems to be the direction current research is taking. In the process, 
though, scholars working in this area would be well advised to stay in dialogue with their peers 
studying a range of related topics, from the formation of democratic political parties by Islamic 
groups, to the moderation of or the uptake of non-violence by fundamentalist movements across 
religions. 
12 Though collaboration between major proponents,  such as Philpott and Duffy Toft, has started to take place. See Philpott et al, 
forthcoming.
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